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In which direction is the current reform process taking China? This 
fundamental question is the subject of a host of recent works on China. 
The general consensus seems to be that China is moving away from 
excessive state control in the economy and patrimonial rule in the po-
litical realm towards a market economy and a more pluralistic political 
order. Some analysts (e.g. Bruce Gilley, China's Democratic Future, 2004) 
argue that this process will eventually bring democracy to China. They 
maintain that the CCP is doomed and is bound to wither away or will 
be abolished by new social forces. This thinking is the logical outcome 
of the so-called transition paradigm, which posits that once a country 
moves away from dictatorial rule, there is a linear process towards 
pluralism and democracy. 
Minxin Pei's book provides a sophisticated picture of another possible 
scenario for China's transition. In fact, he argues that there is no transi-
tion to speak of, as China is trapped in a system which he alternatively 
labels a development autocracy, a decentralized predatory state or a 
cleptocracy. This is a system where the agents of the state are engaged 
in rent-seeking, corruption and collusion to beneﬁt themselves, their 
families and their friends. Collusive networks of corrupt ofﬁcials, often 
working together with organized criminal groups, are emerging in many 
parts of China. They form local maﬁa states that undermine the central 
state power and will ultimately cause the regime to collapse.
Minxin Pei highlights what he calls the erosion of state capacity in 
China by discussing the Chinese government's performance in several 
critical areas: taxation, health and education, enforcement of laws and 
rules, etc. In all these areas he sees a decline of state capacity. He also 
argues that the CCP is suffering a decline. He sees this evidenced in the 
shrinkage of the Party's organizational penetration, in the erosion of its 
authority, and in the breakdown of its internal discipline. 
Minxin Pei is only the latest of a long row of analysts who maintain 
that the CCP is undergoing atrophy rather than adaptation. However, he 
seems to overlook the fact that in recent years the Party has introduced 
a number of internal reforms designed to make it better equipped to 
rule China in a modern globalized world. Thus a number of measures 
concerning recruitment, appointment and supervision have been im-
plemented to reform the cadre management system. In 2002 alone, six 
major documents to reform and regularize cadre supervision and dis-
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cipline were published. In 2005 a new civil service law was published 
further regulating the work of state cadres. As a result of these measures, 
Chinese cadres are in general much better educated and much younger 
than during Mao's and Deng's time. There are now strict age and educa-
tional criteria for advancing up the various rungs of the career ladder. 
That the Chinese leadership takes all this very serious was evidenced 
at the important 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in 
September 2004, where the Party adopted an important 'Decision of the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening 
the Party's Ability to Govern'. A few days later, Vice-President Zeng 
Qinghong in a lengthy article in the People's Daily discussed ''the painful 
lesson of the loss of power'' by the communist parties in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Zeng stressed that improving the governing 
capacity of the Party and upgrading the quality of the cadre corps would 
determine whether the CCP would survive or perish. There are many 
other examples of how the regime debates state and party capacity. In 
sum, Minxin Pei overlooks the fact that the Party has been engaged in 
a process of renewal and reform that dates back to the mid-1990s. In 
this sense, Minxin Pei's study breaks no new ground.
Reading Minxin Pei's book, one wonders how China and its leaders 
have been able to spearhead an unprecedented economic growth tra-
jectory that has turned China into an economic superpower and lifted 
millions of Chinese out of poverty. Pei reluctantly admits that this is 
the case, but he argues that the costs are enormous. The growth rate has 
been pumped up by high savings and massive shifts of population from 
agriculture to industry. Such high investments rates can propel growth 
'even though the economic system remains relatively inefﬁcient'. In his 
mind, Chinese growth is not high-quality growth but low-quality growth, 
since it is achieved at the expense of rising inequalities, underinvestment 
in human capital, damage to the environment, etc. Pei predicts that the 
'pathologies of a trapped transition will have a material impact on mac-
roeconomic performance in future years' (p. 209), i.e. China will not be 
able to sustain the current economic hypergrowth for very long.
As indicated above, Pei's book reminds us that perhaps the aca-
demic discourse on China operates with the wrong paradigm. This is 
a paradigm (the transition paradigm) that is rooted in the assumption 
of China's inevitable political change brought about by rapid economic 
development and the concomitant development of new social groups. 
Some scholars within this paradigm even predict that when countries 
reach a certain income level, democratization is bound to occur. De-
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mocratization processes in South Korea and Taiwan and other emerg-
ing economies seem to substantiate these assumptions. In the 1990s, 
the paradigm of a China headed for political change also attracted 
the business community. Thus many multinational corporations de-
fended their increasing business with China by arguing that increasing 
economic interaction and trade would be the key that would unlock 
the door towards liberalization and democracy. Similarly, when the 
George Bush and Bill Clinton administrations extended most-favoured 
nation trade beneﬁts to China, they argued that increased trade would 
integrate China in the world economy and thereby help bring political 
liberalization to China.
China's Trapped Transition would argue that this is not a likely scenario. 
First, the economic gains in China will be appropriated by a layer of rent-
seeking party and state ofﬁcials. Second, the instability of the regime will 
prevent economic gains from being translated into political gains. The 
present leaders are primarily interested in rent-seeking and will seek 
ways of securing their proﬁts in time. Says Minxin Pei: 'One of the lessons 
many Chinese elites learned from the fall of the Soviet Union was that they 
should have an exit strategy and insurance policy' (p. 154). Therefore, by 
implication, China will collapse before it becomes democratic.
What if Minxin Pei is wrong? What if China manages to continue on 
its current economic path and its political system does not change in 
any fundamental way? What if the Party manages to revitalize itself and 
succeeds in improving its governing capacity? What if,  thirty years from 
now, a wealthier China continues to be run by a one-party regime that 
continues to refuse open and organized political dissent, and yet is even 
more intertwined with the rest of the world in terms of trade, investment, 
and other economic ties? This is what James Mann recently has called 
the Third Scenario and what Thomas Carothers calls 'dominant-power 
politics'. Carothers maintains that most existing transitional countries 
are stuck in a grey zone where they are neither clearly dictatorial nor 
clearly headed towards democracy. They get stuck in the transition 
process, so to speak. In this sense, neither the transition paradigm nor 
Pei's version of China's trapped transition will come true and the world 
will be faced with new theoretical and practical challenges in coming 
to terms with 'China's rise'.
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